dimanche 24 mai 2015

Goal: The Story of How Women’s Soccer Rose to Fame

Men’s sports have been around since the ancient times, but what about women’s sports like women’s soccer? Although there have been rumors of women playing soccer much earlier, the major rise of women’s soccer started after 1863 when the English Football Association standardized the rules of the game.

This now safer game became very popular for women all over the United Kingdom, and soon after the rule change, it was almost as popular as men’s soccer (“History of”).

In 1920, two women’s soccer teams played each other in front of a massive crowd of 53,000 people in Liverpool, England.

Although that was a major achievement for women’s soccer, it had terrible consequences for the women’s league in the United Kingdom; the English Football Association was threatened by the size of women’s soccer, so they banned women from playing soccer on the same fields as men.

Due to this, women’s soccer declined in the U.K., which caused a decline in nearby places as well. It wasn’t until 1930, when Italy and France created women’s leagues, that women’s soccer started to rise again. Then, after World War II, countries all over Europe started women’s soccer leagues (“Women in”).

Even though most countries had women’s teams, it wasn’t until 1971 that the ban was lifted in England and women could play on the same fields as the men (“History of”).

A year after the ban was lifted, women’s soccer in America became more popular due to Title IX. Title IX required that equal funding was given to men’s and women’s sports in colleges.

The new law meant that more women could go to college with a sports scholarship, and as a result, it meant that women’s soccer was becoming a more common sport at colleges all over the United States (“Women’s Soccer in”).

Surprisingly, it wasn’t until the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta that women’s soccer was an Olympic event. At that Olympic Games there were only 40 events for women and double the amount of men participants as there were women (“American Women”).

One massive step forward for women’s soccer was the first Women’s World Cup, which is a soccer tournament that has teams from all over the world play each other. This first tournament was held in China on November 16-30, 1991.

Dr. Hao Joao Havelange, the president of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) during that time, was the person that initiated the first Women’s World Cup, and because of that first World Cup, the United States created a name for itself in women’s soccer.

At that tournament, the U.S won, beating Norway 2-1 in the finals (above). The U.S. later won the third Women’s World Cup in 1999, beating China in a shootout; that tournament was held in the United States. In later World Cups, the United States didn’t win, but they always placed in at least second or third place. (“FIFA”).

As women’s soccer grew more popular, magazines and newspapers started to publish pictures of women playing soccer. One of the first articles was from 1869 (right); it shows a group of women playing ball in their dresses.

Another article from 1895 shows the North Team after they had won a game against the South Team (below on left).The article, it stateswomen are unfit to play soccer and that women’s soccer is a type of entertainment that is frowned upon by society (“Antique Women’s”).

Works CitedOver time, the articles and publicity of women’s soccer became more positive. Along with these positive articles, there were also some players that became legends. Some of the most legendary players are: Mia Hamm, Marta, and Abby Wambach.

Mia Hamm, who played for the Women’s National Team in the U.S., has been titled FIFA’s World Player of the Year twice, and she led the U.S to victory in two World Cups and the 1996 and 2004 Olympics. Many female soccer players consider her an inspiration due to her many skills and achievements.

Marta plays for Brazil, and she has been tilted FIFA’s World Player of the Year five times. Although she has never won a World Cup, she is still very popular because of her wide array of tricks and skills. Abby Wambach plays for the United States.

She has been titled the U.S. Soccer Athlete of the Year five times, and she has scored a total of 134 goals in her professional career. She has yet to win a World Cup, but the U.S Women’s National Team is in the 2015 World Cup in Canada (“10 Greatest”).With every year, more and more girls start to play soccer, so it will not be long before there are even more female players that everybody knows about.

 

Courtney Bayer

 

Works Cited

“10 Greatest Female Soccer Players in History.” Bleacher Report. Bleacher Report, Inc., n.d. Web. 12 Dec. 2014. .

“American Women in the Olympics.” American Women in the Olympics. National Women’s History Museum., n.d. Web. 12 Dec. 2014. .

“Antique Women’s Uniforms.”  History of Women’s Football. N.p., n.d. Web. 12 Dec. 2014. .

“FIFA Women’s World Cup China PR 1991.” FIFA.com. FIFA, n.d. Web. 12 Dec. 2014. .

“History of Women’s Soccer.” History of Women’s Soccer. Soccer-Fans-Info, n.d. Web. 12 Dec. 2014. .

“Women in Soccer.” History Of Soccer! N.p., n.d. Web. 12 Dec. 2014. .

“Women’s Soccer in the United States.” Timetoast. Timetoast, n.d. Web. 12 Dec. 2014. .

Downfall of a Dynasty: The February Revolution

The slogan “Daite khleb – Give us bread!” echoed throughout Petrograd as 90,000 people gathered to strike against the tsar, Nicholas Romanov (“February Revolution”). The demonstration began on March 8th, 1917 when working class women marched through the capital’s streets angry over food scarcity, overgrown breadlines, and the seemingly indifferent tsar.

They ardently demanded for change – anything to at least put more food on the table. Evolving into a large scale revolution, the insurgency lasted less than a week, but their influence forced Nicholas to abdicate the throne.

The events leading to the February Revolution had left the nation simmering, and Petrograd was the outlet. Nicholas’s rationing of bread infuriated his subjects.

On top of food scarcity, Russia was poorly equipped to fight in the Great War. The tsar’s command over the army was less than stellar, and while he was commanding troops, he left his German-born wife Alexandra in charge of the country. In addition to these problems, Nicholas’s repeated dissolving of the Dumas, a “workers government” with the final say in the tsar’s laws, fueled the Russian peoples’ anger (“Why”).

The populace was suffering, and his subjects were ready to revolt.

The revolution began small, but within a few days it amassed underground activists with men and women from all around the city.

The day the February Revolution began, Nicholas was on a train to Stavka, blissfully unaware of the upheaval taking place. The next day, March 10th, the mass of people in Petrograd had grown larger, and they were yelling “Down with the war!” and “Down with the tsar!” Incensed mobs of workers destroyed police stations; however, in Stavka, Nicholas paid little attention to the frantic reports streaming in about the riots in Petrograd (Siegalbaum).

He merely observed the quality of the refreshing air, and he wrote to Alexandra saying, “My brain is resting here. No ministers, no troubling questions, no demanding thought” (Fleming 161).

Rioters in Petrograd during the February Revolution (Russian Revolution) The foremost banner says, “Long Live the Council of Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Deputies” (Fleming 245).

By then, most city workers were on strike, bringing the entire city to a halt; there was no electricity and no water. They waved banners, chanted, and threw rocks and chunks of ice at the police.

Nicholas’s desperate ministers offered their resignations if only the tsar were to return, yet Nicholas could not grasp the seriousness of the situation, refusing to return. Instead, he called armed soldiers to quell the revolt.

On March 11th, demonstrators taking to the streets early were greeted with posters declaring it was forbidden to assemble, and if they did so, the strikers would be immediately and forcibly disbanded. Nevertheless, they surged through the streets.

In reaction, the soldiers fired.

Two hundred strikers lay dead and forty were wounded. The soldiers, many who were country boys recently deported from their villages, were sickened at the sight and sympathized with the demonstrators. They had had enough. Many troops emptied their rifles into the air and joined the revolution (Fleming).

One furious officer commanding a company refusing to fire ordered they “aimed for the heart.” The soldiers shot him instead. The Duma president, Mikhail Rodzianko, pleaded with the tsar in a telegram:

“Your majesty, save Russia; she is threatened with humiliation and disgrace… Urgently summon a person in whom the whole country can have faith and entrust him with the formation of the government that all people trust… In this terrible hour… there is no other way out and to delay is impossible.” (Fleming 163)

Nicholas ignored the telegram and continued his evening playing dominos declaring, “That fat Rodzianko has written all sorts of nonsense to me, to which I shall not even reply” (Fleming 163).

Monday, March 12, the uprising was still growing in numbers and strength.

The tsar’s own army joined the revolutionaries, and the whole city was in chaos. They raided the arsenal, set prisoners free, looted shops, and burned police stations and other government buildings.

Instead of putting out the fires, firemen cheered and watched the buildings burn. With Nicholas oblivious and absent, the people needed order and leadership, so the Duma stepped up and temporarily took charge to calm the revolt. Nevertheless, the Duma did little to abate the people’s anger (Fleming).

Nicholas Romanov on the imperial train, the location of where he writes the Abdication Manifesto (Emperor Nicholas II).

Days later, March 15th, Nicholas’s train arrived in Pskov, delayed by revolutionaries who had seized control of the tracks. Suddenly, telegrams began to flood in from Nicholas’s most valued generals.

In order to save the war effort, the country, and his dynasty, Nicholas would have to resign his autocratic power. Hours later, after heavy chain smoking and pondering the telegrams, he wrote his Abdication Manifesto, giving up the throne in favor of his brother Grand Duke Michael (Fleming).

In Petrograd, when the mob learned of the news, they exploded with anger. They wanted a republic, not a new tsar. They inundated the streets screaming “Down with the dynasty!”, toppling all tsarist symbols. In the Winter Palace, Nicholas’s picture was slashed with bayonets.

A new tsar would only incite more violence and possibly a civil war, so after carefully listening to reports of Petrograd, Michael declined the throne and 304 years of Romanov rule came to an end (Fleming).

After Nicholas’s abdication, revolutionaries dismantled any tsarist symbol including the bronze statue of Alexander the III, Nicholas’s father (Alexander III).

The nation reveled at the demise of the Romanov dynasty. Red flags were hung from roofs and balconies. Everyone was singing, dancing and marching in parades.

Cannons went off, and passionate orators rallied the crowds. Overnight, red ribbons appeared everywhere, and Russian soldiers fighting in the trenches shouted with delight. The public rejoiced over their newfound freedom of expression, resulting in trade unions, newspapers, and political organizations (Siegalbaum).

One villager remembers, “People kissed each other from joy and said that life from now on would be good” (Fleming 177). This one moment in history changed the course of Russia’s entire history. Thus, the Russian Revolution had officially begun.

 

 

Hannah Kendall

 

Works Cited

Alexander III. 1917. Moscow, Russia. Print.

Emperor Nicholas II. 1917. St. Petersburg, Russia. Print.

“February Revolution Begins in Russia.” History.com. A&E Television Networks, n.d. Web. 13 Dec. 2014.

Fleming, Candace. The Family Romanov: Murder, Rebellion & the Fall of Imperial Russia. Schwartz & Wade, 8 July 2014. Print.

Russian Revolution. 1917. St. Petersburg, Russia. Print.

Siegalbaum, Lewis. “1917: February Revolution.” February Revolution. N.p., n.d. Web. 14 Dec. 2014.

“Why Was There A Disaster in 1917?” JohnDClare. N.p., n.d. Web. 13 Dec. 2014.

 

 

 

America’s Favorite Little Darling: The Story of Shirley Temple

Shirley Jane Temple is who people called America’s favorite little darling. It was for good reason too. Shirley Temple was an outstanding little girl while growing up and dealing with family, co-workers, and directors.

She was born on April 23, 1928 and died recently on February 10, 2014 at the ripe, old age of 85. The actress’s early life was full of adventure and success, and it started at a very early age of four in Santa Monte, California.

Shirley Temple’s parents were George and Gertrude Temple. Gertrude was a big help and supporter of her daughter. Every single film that Shirley partook in, her mother would do her daughter’s hair, and each time, Shirley had exactly 56 curls in her hair.

Photography helped to spread the word of Shirley Temple, the picture above is a professional one taken for fame purposes (“Beautiful Women” 3). She won an Oscar at the young age of 6 years in 1937. As a child, her idol was Bill Robinson, which she got a chance to perform with when she was older.

John Agar was Shirley’s first husband at 17 years old. Her first daughter was Linda Susan Agar. Five years after their marriage, John Agar and Shirley Temple divorced. After almost a decade, Shirley remarried to Charles Black.

Shirley’s next two children with Charles were Lori Black and Charles Alden Black Jr., but all three children were siblings just the same. Later on, Charles Black Sr. died after the birth of his children due to bone marrow failure. Shirley Temple grew up to become a standard, everyday American from the little girl star to the below picture at 17 years old (“Five Kid Stars who Ended up Totally Normal” 2).

As an adult, one of Shirley Temple’s later jobs was to be ambassador of Ghana and Czechoslovakia. In December 1998, Temple’s lifetime accomplishments were celebrated at the Kennedy Center Honors, held at the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in Washington, D.C.

She also received a Lifetime Achievement Award from the Screen Actors Guild in year of 2005. Later on, she lost her curls and became a mother and grandmother as shown in the picture below (“Shirley Temple, iconic child star, died at 85” 1).

The little girl participated in 44 films before the she was 12 years old. Throughout her lifetime, she performed in 57 films altogether. Two particular films included Snow White and the Seven Dwarves and Beauty and the Beast. Shirley Temple was able to sing, dance, and act all at the early age of three years old.

In the film industry, Shirley got to audition for many roles. One specific occurrence in which she auditioned for a role she didn’t get was Dorothy in the Wizard of Oz. Coming to a decision that her voice range was limited for the role of Dorothy, the directors decided to go with Judy Garland, their original first choice.

On another occasion, Shirley Temple auditioned for Our Gang, but sadly the director and Shirley’s mother disagreed on letting the new star receive a star billing, a contract/agreement with the star to decide the price of her role to send the bill, so she did not get in.

Temple preferred to do her own stunts, arguing that the hard work made her feel like “one of the gang.” Like many young stars, Temple learned early to rely on herself. In her first films, she was banished to a black box if she behaved childishly at only four years old.

Rather than becoming petulant and rebellious, Temple later wrote that this “lesson of life was profound and unforgettable.” Encouraged to be wise beyond her years, mouthing adult lines and thrust into grown-up situations, Shirley Temple cherished being a child and never stopped growing younger than she really was.

Some of Shirley’s most famous quotes were; “I wanted to be in the FBI. I also wanted to be a pie salesman. It was so intense that the studio got the prop department to make a little pie wagon, and they filled it with tarts. I wheeled it around the set and sold them to the crew. I was about eight years old, I always sold out and I didn’t have to pay for them. It was a great deal!” also; “When I was 14, I was the oldest I ever was. I’ve been getting younger ever since,” and; “Make-believe colors the past with innocent distortion, and it swirls ahead of us in a thousand ways: in science, in politics, in every bold intention.” These quotes tell just how quickly the little girl grew up and how she went about her day in the acting business.

Shirley temple was a witty and funny character from the start. She was a sly and cunning little girl. Many instances took place where she used this sense of cleverness. “I stopped believing in Santa Claus when I was six. Mother took me to see him in a department store and he asked for my autograph.”

Other instances came to light when she got older. “Dr. Kissinger was a former child. Jerry Ford was a former child. Even F.D.R. was a former child. I retired from the movies in 1949, and I’m still a former child.”

She kept children singing “On the Good Ship Lollipop” for generations. Carina, Avery Gleason, Sophia Lucia, and June Winters have all performed it on YouTube in the last ten years (“Lollipop Dance” 5). Since the acting, Shirley self-taught herself to cry on cue;” I guess I was an early method actress.

I would go to a quiet part of the sound stage with my mother. I wouldn’t think of anything sad, I would just make my mind a blank. In a minute I could cry.

I didn’t like to cry after lunch, because I was too content.” Crying did come in handy at age 21: “Driving up the Pacific Coast Highway near Malibu in a red convertible, she was stopped for speeding. She turned on the tears, and the officers ended up escorting her home. She retired from acting at age 21 and went on to a diplomatic career.”

The legacy of Shirley Temple is one to always be remembered. She was a positive and cheerful little girl. Being kind and helpful to almost everyone she met was a repeated attribute told by relatives and close co-actors. She even had a cocktail drink, the Shirley Temple, named in her honor. As a result of her great success, Shirley Temple will always be remembered as America’s favorite little darling.

 

 

Dayna Bergman

 

Works Cited

“Shirley Temple Biography.” IMDb. IMDb, Inc.com. Web. http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000073/bio?ref_=nm_ov_bio_sm

“Shirley Temple Movies.” Angelfire. Angelfire, Inc. Web. http://www.angelfire.com/ct2/dimple/movie.html

“Shirley Temple.” BrainyQuote.com. Xplore Inc, 2014. 8 December 2014. http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/s/shirley_temple.html

“Ten Fun Facts about Shirley Temple.” Entertainment News. Epoch Times, Inc. Web. http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/501958-10-fun-facts-about-shirley-temple

Churchill, Bonnie. “Biography.” Shirley Temple Biography. People Magazine. Web. http://www.shirleytemplefans.com/hist/hist.htm

“Shirley Temple’s 10 Most Memorable Quotes.” Rediff Movies. Rediff, Inc. Web. http://www.rediff.com/movies/report/shirley-temples-10-most-memorable-quotes/20140212.htm

“Five Kid Stars Who Ended up Totally Normal.” All Chic. All Chic, Inc. Web. http://allchic.com/five-kid-stars-ended-totally-normal

“Shirley Temple, Iconic Child Star, Dies at 85.” WDRB. WDRB.com. Web. http://www.wdrb.com/story/24689097/shirley-temple-iconic-child-star-dies-at-85

“Photography.” White Pride World Wide. Jelsoft Enterprises Ltd. Web. https://www.stormfront.org/forum/t1005453/

“On the Good Ship Lollipop.” YouTube. YouTube. Web. https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=on+the+good+ship+lollipop

History of the Interior Design of the Oval Office

The good folks over at The Rug Sellers have put together this great infograph detailing the history of the interior design of the Oval Office.

Enjoy!

History of interior design of the oval office

Mao and Fanon: Competing Theories of Violence in the Era of Decolonization

 

The Wretched of the Earth by Frantz Fanon offers a powerful critique of colonial rule, while at the same time providing a call for violent and revolutionary struggle against European imperialism. Written in 1961 and in the context of the Algerian War of Independence, Fanon extols the virtues of violence as a means to liberate colonial subjects both politically and physiologically.  Yet while The Wretched of the Earth is often lauded, or condemned as a revolutionary or dangerous treatise, Fanon’s philosophies on violence cannot and should not be viewed in isolation.

In this respect, it is useful to compare Fanon’s writings, and in particular his theories on violence in de-colonial and revolutionary struggles, with those of Mao Zedong, who I argue provided an equally attractive, and at the time more influential, justification of violence. There are remarkable similarities between both authors, in terms of their analysis of the inherent violence in colonial rule, as well an in their perspective of violence as a cleansing or legitimizing force in revolutionary struggles.

Both rely on Hegelian philosophy, in particular is dialectic reasoning, as well as Marxist interpretations of class struggle to underpin their philosophies, although they depart from classical Marxists in advocating for armed resistance amongst the peasantry rather than the urban proletariat. However, where Fanon’s analysis is primarily existential, in that he seeks to explore the nature of violence itself, Mao’s view of violence is primarily instrumental, in that it seeks to provide a practical guide for the use of violence in guerrilla operations.

No aspect of The Wretched of the Earth has been as debated as Fanon’s justification of violence. Though by no means exhaustive, it is useful I think to consider Frazer and Hutchings summary of Fanon’s philosophy of violence;

“First, it [violence] is a means necessary to political action – that is, his justification is instrumental. Second, it is an organic force or energy that follows its own logic”[1]

However, this summary should be taken with caution, for in my view Frazer and Hutchings overemphasis the instrumentalist aspect of Fanon’s philosophy. While Fanon certainly justified the use of violence in instrumentalist terms, which is to say that violence is a means to a political end (i.e. decolonization), his analysis of violence in de-colonial struggles is primarily centred on exploring the nature of violence itself.[2] In this sense, Fanon’s view of violence is primarily existential.[3]

Fanon does not discuss tactics and as such The Wretched of the Earth cannot be viewed as offering practical guidance to guerrilla movements to the same extent that Mao’s military writings did, which were based on his own experience of guerrilla warfare against first the Japanese and then the Kuomintang.[4] Rather, Fanon focuses on the nature of the colonial regime (which he views as inherently and systemically violent), and as such the necessity for violent struggle rather than political accommodation as necessary pre-requisites to independence.

Fanon’s justification of violence is rationalized by his analysis of European colonial rule, which he characterizes as inherently violent.[5] In the opening lines of the Wretched of the Earth, Fanon declares that “decolonization is always a violent event….it reeks of red-hot cannonballs and bloody knives.”[6] This notion of violence as an integral part of the colonial system is a central theme throughout the work, and Fanon addresses it repeatedly. Later on, Fanon notes that, “colonialism is not a machine capable of thinking, a body endowed with reason. It is naked violence and only gives in when confronted with greater violence.”[7] Violence is justified, but only insofar as it is used to overthrow an inherently violent system.

Though it is not the focus of this paper, it is important to note that Fanon’s views on violent revolution stand in marked contrast with those of M. K. Gandhi, who argued that non-violence was the best means to overthrow colonial rule.[8] For Gandhi, independence could only be gained through ‘internal self-control’. [9] For his part, Fanon decried non-violence as, “an attempt to settle the colonial problem around the negotiating table”[10], thereby ensuring that a corrupted and co-opted colonial bourgeoisie merely replaced the old European overlords.[11] Non-violence was a path to bourgeois siege oppression. Only through violent struggle could the masses free themselves from both forms of despotism.

However, that is not to say that Fanon glorifies violence even within the context of decolonization, and certainly not to the same extent as Jean-Paul Sartre does in his preface to The Wretched of the Earth, who declared that “violence, like Achilles’ spear, can heal the wounds it has inflicted”.[12] For Sartre, violence is the ‘only means of historical change’.[13] Even Hannah Arendt, whose book On Violence devotes a great deal of time to refuting what she describes as an “undeniable glorification of violence” in The Wretched of the Earth, recognized that Sartre went further than Fanon in justifying the virtues of violence.[14]

Homi K. Bhabha goes further, and notes in his forward to The Wretched of the Earth that “the man [Fanon], deep down hated it [violence]”.[15] Fanon is deeply conscious of the effects of such violent acts upon the individual psychosis; indeed the last section of The Wretched of the Earth, titled ‘Colonial War and Mental Disorders’, explores this theme in depth. As such, it is perhaps best to view Fanon’s philosophy of violence within the decolonization, in which violence is an inevitable part of the struggle for freedom given the nature of the system it is attempting to overthrow.

This notion that only a greater exertion of violence can overthrow a violent system is significant in relation to Fanon’s justification of violence as a cleansing force. Not only is violence a tool to be utilized in the struggle for political freedom and independence, but it is also the means by which a colonial subject frees himself psychologically from colonial rule and a colonial mindset.[16]

“At the individual level, violence is a cleansing force. It rids the colonized from their inferiority complex, of their passive and despairing attitude. It emboldens them, and restores their self-confidence”.[17]

In this sense, Fanon is more clearly in line with Sartre. Yet, even though Fanon provides a powerful critique of colonialism, especially in respect in its inherent violent nature, and proceeds to rationalize violent struggle as the only means to overthrow a violent system, he does not explain how such a revolution is to be achieved. True, Fanon discusses at length the need for guerrilla operations and notes various guerrilla movements in Africa (most notable is his discussion of the FLN in Algeria), but he does not explain how such operations are to be achieved or how violence can to be applied as an instrument of war.[18]

Mao

Given the absence in The Wretched of the Earth of any discussion on the application of violence, I believe Fanon’s theories of violence must be compared with the contemporary political thought of Mao Zedong, which I would argue during the 1960s and 1970s provided an equally attractive and more influential rationale for violence in de-colonial struggles.[19]

Mao’s political thought was especially attractive to leftist organizations in European colonies during the 1960s and 1970s for numerous reasons, chief amongst them was the fact that Mao had successfully led the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to victory over the Chinese Nationalists and Japanese in the 1940s.[20] As such, Mao’s writings on revolutionary struggle (most of which date from the period of the CCP’s guerrilla campaigns in the 1930s and 1940s) could be seen as offering practical guidance to other revolutionary movements around the world.[21]

In addition, by the mid-1960s Mao had come to view China as the center of the world revolutionary movement, and as such he and the CCP expressed their public support for various de-colonial movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.[22] For example, on May 3 and 7, 1960 Mao received large delegations of workers unions and students from 14 different countries of Africa and Latin America.[23] The Foreign Language Press of Peking ran editorials detailing the meetings, and noted that Mao “expressed full sympathy and support for the heroic struggle of the African people against imperialism and colonialism”.[24]

Mao’s justification of violence, which he explores in numerous works but especially in On Guerrilla Warfare, reads more like a practical manual than an existential treatise. Mao famously proclaimed that “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun”.[25] For Mao, armed struggle was an essential component in any revolutionary struggle. Without it neither the “proletariat, nor the people, nor the Communist Party would have any standing at all”.[26] Violence, then, is a legitimizing factor for a revolutionary organization. Non-violence is not an option in Mao’s conception of revolutionary struggle since it would deprive a revolutionary movement of its principle means of legitimacy.

Yet, as already noted, Mao and Fanon differ radically in the manner in which they conceptualize and present their rationalization of violence in their respective writings. In contrast to Fanon’s works, which provides only a rationale for guerrilla warfare, Mao’s treatises read like a practical manual for the application of such violent struggle. For instance, Mao outlines a three-stages theory for guerrilla operations; strategic defense, stalemate, and strategic offense, and stressed the need to consider the political context when preparing for each stage of a guerrilla operation.[27]

In this way Mao links an instrumentalist understanding of the usefulness of violence in revolutionary struggles to a practical goal of overthrowing a colonial regime while maintaining the support of the masses to a degree that Fanon never achieves (and probably never sought to achieve).

It is important to note the influence of Hegel’s dialectical reasoning on the writings of both Fanon and Mao. Yet, I would argue this influence should be understood not through the writings of Hegel himself, but rather through the interpretation and application of Hegel’s theory of dialectical reasoning in the writings of Sartre and Clausewitz.

Fanon was largely influenced by Sartre in his own use of Hegelian dialectic reasoning, and in particular by Sartre’s Anti-Semite and the Jew.[28] Sartre reasoned that “it is not the Jewish character that provokes anti-Semitism but rather . . . it is the anti-Semite who creates the Jew”.[29] The similarities between Sartre’s analysis of anti-Semitism and Fanon’s own conceptualization of the settler-colonized relationship are striking; “It is the colonist who fabricated and continues to fabricate the colonized subject”.[30]

Mao, by contrast, understood Hegel’s concept of dialectic reasoning primarily through his readings of Clausewitz’s On War, which utilized a dialectic approach to examine the relationship of offense and defense in guerrilla operations.[31] As such, Mao came to view guerilla warfare (and violence more generally), in relational terms (Clausewitz compared it to the dynamic of a wrestling match).[32] That Mao would seek to explore the nature of this dynamic and to articulate the factors that govern violence in revolutionary struggles should not therefore come as any great surprise.

Who then were to be the agents of this revolutionary violence? Both Fanon and Mao depart from the Marxist-Leninist view of history in a number of important respects, primary in their belief that it is the rural peasantry, not the urban proletariat, which are to be the vanguard of a new revolutionary struggle against colonial rule.[33] Marx himself believed that the peasant was at heart a conservative creature, a ‘sack of potatoes’, and that their agrarian life bred in the peasantry a collective ‘rural idiocy’.[34] For Marx and later Lenin, only the urban proletariat can be the engine of revolution, although Lenin did concede that it is sometimes necessary to form a temporary alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry in primarily agrarian societies.[35]

Fanon, however, rejects any notion of relying on the urban proletariat in a revolutionary movement, and insists that only the peasantry is revolutionary. He states that,

“It is obvious that in colonial countries only the peasantry is revolutionary. It has nothing to lose and everything to gain. The underprivileged and starving peasant is the exploited who very soon discovers that only violence pays”[36]

The proletariat, by contrast, cannot be the engine of such revolution because it is first too small, and second because it has been co-opted by the colonial regime as well as the native bourgeois elements.[37]

Mao takes a similar perspective, though he is not as explicit as Fanon. Whereas Fanon refers explicitly to the revolutionary potential of peasantry, due to their inherently oppressed state, Mao preferred to speak of the masses and the mass line.[38] That being said, that Mao equated the term ‘masses’ with ‘peasants’ cannot be doubted given that China remained in the period of the Chinese Civil War an overwhelmingly peasant society.[39] Mao declared that that the “masses are the real heroes”, that they have “boundless creative power” and more explicitly, that the “peasant movement is a colossal event”.[40]

It can therefore be stated that Fanon and Mao viewed and justified violence in remarkably similar ways. Both saw violence as inevitable in revolutionary struggles (particularly in guerrilla operations) against violent colonial regimes, and stressed the importance of the peasantry as the vanguard of colonial liberation (in contrast to Marxist-Leninism which emphasized the proletariat as the vanguard of the world revolution).

However, Fanon and Mao differ in their conceptualization of violent struggle in terms of their focus. Fanon chose to analyse the nature of the colonial regime, which he characterized as inherently violent, and its impact (both physical and physiologically) on the individual colonial subject. His justification of violence is rooted in his understanding of violence as a liberating force (both literally and figuratively) for the colonized masses.

Mao, by contrast, emphasizes the role of violence as an instrument of political power, and as such his works provide not only a rationale for guerrilla warfare, but also advice to revolutionary movements on how to conduct such operations based upon Mao’s own guerrilla experiences. In short, Fanon justifies violent struggle primarily in existential terms while Mao applies a more instrumentalist rationale for violent revolution.

Bibliography

Primary Sources:

Arendt, Hannah. 1970. On Violence. New York: Brace and World.

Fan, K. ed. 1972. Mao Tse-Tung and Lin Piao: Post-Revolutionary Writings. New York: Anchor Books.

Fanon, Frantz. 1961. The Wretched of the Earth, translated by Richard Philcox with forward by Homi K. Bhabha and preface by Jean-Paul Sartre. New York: Grove Press, 2004.

Mao Zedong, 1967. Chairman Mao Tse-Tung on People’s War. Peking: Foreign Language Press.

Mao Zedong, 1972. Quotations from Chairman Mao Tsetung. Peking: Foreign Language Press.

Marx, Karl. 1990. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. I, translated by Ben Fowkes. London: Penguin Books.

Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1948. Anti-Semite and the Jew. New York: Schocken Books, 1995.

Secondary Sources:

Bunker, Robert. 1999. “Unconventional Warfare Philosophers”. Small Wars and Insurgencies 10, no. 3: 136-149.

Frazer, Elizabeth and Kimberly Hutchings. 2008. “On Politics and Violence: Arendt Contra Fanon”. Contemporary Political Theory 7, no. 1: 90-108.

Gendzier, Irene L. 1973. Frantz Fanon: A Critical Study. New York: Pantheon Books.

Kaempf, Sebastian. 2009. “Violence and Victory: guerrilla warfare, ‘authentic self-affirmation’ and the overthrow of the colonial state”. Third World Quarterly 30, no. 1: 129-146.

Kawash, Samira. “Terrorists and Vampires: Fanon’s Spectral Violence of Decolonization” in Anthony C. Allesandrini, ed. 1999. Franz Fanon: Critical Perspectives. London: Routledge.

Meisner, Maurice. 1999. Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, 3rd ed. New York: The Free Press.

Perinbam, Marie B. 1973. “Fanon and the Revolutionary Peasantry: The Algerian Case”. The Journal of Modern African Studies 11, no. 3: 427-445.

Presbey, Gail M. “Fanon on the Role of Violence in Liberation: A Comparison with Gandhi and Mandela” in Lewis R. Gordon, T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting, and Renée T. White, eds. 1996. Fanon: A Critical Reader. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Schram, Stuart R. 1969. The Political Thought of Mao Tse-Tung, revised ed. New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers.

[1] Elizabeth Frazer and Kimberly Hutchings. 2008. “On Politics and Violence: Arendt Contra Fanon.” Contemporary Political Theory 7, no. 1: 102.

[2] Sebastian Kaempf, 2009. “Violence and Victory: guerrilla warfare, ‘authentic self-affirmation’ and the overthrow of the colonial state”. Third World Quarterly 30, no. 1: 129.

[3] Kaempf, 129.

[4] Kaempf, 136.

[5] Kaempf, 131.

[6] Frantz Fanon, 1961. The Wretched of the Earth, translated by Richard Philcox with forward by Homi K. Bhabha and preface by Jean-Paul Sartre, (New York: Grove Press, 2004): 1, 3.

[7] Fanon, 23.

[8] Gail M. Presbey, “Fanon on the Role of Violence in Liberation: A Comparison with Gandhi and Mandela” in Lewis R. Gordon, T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting, and Renée T. White, eds. 1996. Fanon: A Critical Reader. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 283.

[9] Presbey, 288.

[10] Fanon, 23.

[11] Fanon, 21-22.

[12] Jean-Paul Sartre, Preface in Fanon, 1961, xii; Marx expressed a similar idea when he stated that ‘force is the midwife of every old society which is pregnant with a new one’. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. I, translated by Ben Fowkes, (London: Penguin Books, 1990): 916.

[13] Samira Kawash, “Terrorists and Vampires: Fanon’s Spectral Violence of Decolonization” in Anthony C. Allesandrini, ed. 1999. Franz Fanon: Critical Perspectives. (London: Routledge), 235.

[14] Hannah Arendt, 1970. On Violence. (New York: Brace and World): 122; Frazer and Hutchings, 98-99.

[15] Homi K. Bhabha, Forward in Fanon, 1961, xxi.

[16] Irene L. Gendzier, 1973. Frantz Fanon: A Critical Study, (New York: Pantheon Books), 200-202; Kaempf, 139.

[17] Fanon, 51.

[18] Robert Bunker, 1999. “Unconventional Warfare Philosophers”. Small Wars and Insurgencies 10, no. 3: 141; Fanon, 23; Kaempf 142.

[19] Schram, Stuart R. 1969. The Political Thought of Mao Tse-Tung, revised ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers), 111, 121.

[20] Schram, 123.

[21] Schram, 123; Bunker, 140.

[22] Schram 124.

[23] K. Fan, ed. 1972. Mao Tse-Tung and Lin Piao: Post-Revolutionary Writings. (New York: Anchor Books), 259-260.

[24] Fan, 260

[25] “Problems of War and Strategy” (November 6, 1938), quoted in Quotations from Chairman Mao Tsetung. Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1972), 61.

[26] “Introducing the Communist” (October 4, 1939), quoted in Chairman Mao Tse-Tung on People’s War, (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967), 5.

[27] Bunker, 140.

[28] Kaempf, 139.

[29] Jean-Paul Sartre, 1948. Anti-Semite and the Jew, (New York: Schocken Books, 1995): 152.

[30] Fanon, 2.

[31] Kaempf, 132.

[32] Kaempf, 134.

[33] Fanon, 23; Maurice Meisner, 1999. Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, 3rd ed. (New York: The Free Press): 44.

[34] Marie B. Perinbam, 1973. “Fanon and the Revolutionary Peasantry: The Algerian Case”. The Journal of Modern African Studies 11, no. 3: 428.

[35] Perinbam, 428.

[36] Fanon, 23.

[37] Fanon, 22.

[38] Meisner, 44.

[39] Meisner, 57.

[40] Mao  Zedong, 1972. Quotations from Chairman Mao Tsetung. (Peking: Foreign Language Press): 118-119.

 

Heraclius and the Early Islamic Conquests: An Analysis of Byzantine Military Failure at the Battle of Yarmuk in AD 636

It is one of the great ironies of history that Emperor Heraclius, who rescued the Byzantine Empire from potential collapse at the hands of the Sassanid Empire, should preside over the defeat of the Byzantine army at the hands of the early Arab caliphs. The collapse of Byzantium’s military position in the near-east was sealed by the Battle of Yarmuk (also spelled Yarmouk) in AD 636.

Indeed, it is no exaggeration to state that the Battle of Yarmuk was one of the most decisive battles in history. In the course of six days, a vastly outnumbered Arab army succeeded in annihilating a significantly larger Byzantine force. This defeat led to the permanent loss of not only Syria and Palestine, but also of Egypt and large portions of Mesopotamia, and contributed in part to the rapid collapse of Byzantium’s traditional rival, the Sassanid Empire.

There was no simple explanation for Byzantium’s military failure Yarmuk. Rather, a number of factors including Heraclius flawed military strategy and leadership and the delay of the Byzantine army in responding to the early Arab incursions in the Levant, must be considered.

When Heraclius seized the throne of the Byzantine Empire from Phocas in AD 610, he  inherited an empire on the verge of collapse in the wake of a successful Sassanid offensive.[1] Until AD 622, Heraclius fought a primarily defensive war against the Sassanid’s, slowly rebuilding the remains of the Byzantine army while trying to slow the progress of the Persian offensive.[2]

Finally, in AD 622, Heraclius was able to take the offensive into the Sassanid Empire, and he inflicted a series of crushing defeats against the Sassanid army until he was able to impose a humiliating peace treaty on the Sassanid’s in AD 628.[3]  Yet Heraclius’ victory was only achieved at great expense; over twenty-five years of continuous warfare had exhausted both the Sassanid’s and the Byzantines resources and left them both vulnerable to the invasions by the Arab army’s six years later.[4]

The Arab invasions of the Byzantine East began modestly in AD 634 in a series of tentative raids. Yet, within a span of two years the Arabs were able to score two impressive victories over the Byzantines; the first at Ajnadayn in July 634 and the second at Pella (also known as the Battle of the Mud) in January 635.[5] The result of these battles was the collapse of Byzantine authority throughout the Levant, culminating in the capture of Damascus in September AD 635.[6] Why Heraclius did not respond to these early incursions is unclear.

However, the fall of Damascus finally alerted Herculius to the danger which the Arab invasions posed to Byzantine authority in the east and he organized a massive army to recapture the city.[7]  In the face of a sustained Byzantine counteroffensive, the various Arab armies’ abandoned their recent conquests in Syria and retreated to the Yarmuk river, where they were able to regroup under the leadership of Khalid Ibn al-Walid.[8]

The Byzantines pursuit of the Arabs, however, imposed massive logistical strains on the Empire (and the local population in particular), and served to exacerbate the disputes over strategy within the Byzantine high command.[9] Indeed, Al-Baladhuri in his chronicle of the Arab offensive, stressed that the populations of Syria and Palestine generally welcomed the Arab invaders, as they were viewed as less oppressive than the Byzantine Empire and were often willing to cooperate with Arabs against the Imperial army’s.[10]

Even when the opposing army’s finally met, the Byzantines delayed from mid-May until the 15th of August before finally giving battle.[11] This proved to be fatal mistake as it allowed the Arab army to gather reinforcements, scout out the Byzantine positions, and to close off the Deraa Gap, which prevented the bulk of the Byzantine army from retreating after the battle.[12]

The battle itself occurred over the course of six days. Though the Byzantines initially took the offensive and repulsed some Muslim counterattacks, they were unable to attack the main Arab encampment.[13] In addition, the Arab army was able to use their foot and cavalry archers to great effect, placing them in prepared positions, and were thus able to halt the initial Byzantine advance.[14]  The decisive moment came on August 20, when according to legend,  a sandstorm developed and blew into the Byzantine army, allowing the Arabs to charge the Byzantine line en-masse.[15] The Byzantines, cut off from their main axis of retreat, were systematically massacred. The exact losses are unknown, though Al-Baladhuri states that up to 70,000 Byzantine soldiers were killed during and immediately after the battle.[16]

800px-Battle_of_Yarmuk_Terrain.svg

The size of the army’s at Yarmuk is a matter of fierce debate. Al-Baladhuri, for instance, states that the Muslim army was 24,000 strong and that they faced a Byzantine force of over 200,000.[17] Though the figures for the Arab forces in generally accepted, it is more probable that the Byzantine army contained about 80,000 troops or less.[18] At any rate, it is clear that the Byzantines heavily outnumbered their Arab opponents.

The Byzantine army at Yarmuk, according to Al-Baladhuri, was a multi-ethnic force, comprising Greeks, Syrians, Armenians, and Mesopotamians.[19] While the exact composition of the army is impossible to tell, it is thought that at only one-third of the Byzantine soldiers were peasants from Anatolia with the remaining two-thirds of the army’s ranks were primarily being filled by Armenians, as well as Arab-Ghassanid cavalry.[20]

Multiple factors affected the outcome of the Battle of Yarmuk, most of which were beyond Heraclius’ control. It is important to note that Heraclius, while he personally commanded the Byzantine army in its campaigns against the Persians, remained at Antioch and delegated command to Theodore the Sakellarios and the Armenian prince, Vartan Mamikonian.[21]

This, however, was likely unavoidable. Herculius, who by the 630s was an increasingly ill man suffering from hydrophobia and possibly cancer, was simply too frail to go on campaign with his army.[22] Nevertheless, the lack of effective and coordinated leadership in the Byzantine army, coupled with the superb generalship of Khalid Ibn al-Walid was a likely factor in outcome of the battle.

The skill of the Arab cavalry, particularly the horse archers, also gave the Arab army a distinct advantage in terms of their ability to outmaneuver their Byzantine counterparts. The delay between May and August was disastrous for two reasons; first it provided the Arabs with an invaluable respite to regroup and gather reinforcements. Second, the delay wreaked havoc on the overall moral and discipline of the Byzantine troops; the Armenian contingents in particular grew increasingly agitated and mutinous.[23]

During the battle itself the Armenians seemed to have refused to support the Byzantine troops when they attacked, while the Ghassanid-Arabs remained largely passive towards their fellow Arabs.[24] Why the Byzantines waited so long to give battle remains unclear, but what is beyond doubt is that the delay practically doomed the Byzantines military position as it lay idle on the Yarmuk river.

The legacy of the Battle of Yarmuk was both far reaching and profound. First, and most immediately, the defeat at Yarmuk led to the permanent loss of the entire Byzantine East (Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Egypt), which seriously undermined the Byzantine Empire’s fiscal and military capabilities.

2000px-Byzantiumby650AD.svg

Second, the Arab invasions were perceived by many in Byzantine society as divine retribution for their lack of piety, idolatrous behaviour, and the Emperor’s incestuous marriage to Martina.[25] These and subsequent defeats at the hands of the Muslims provided one of the origins for the Iconoclast crisis which would erupt to the early 8th century.

Third, the battle also stimulated a change in military tactics and strategy on the part of the Byzantines. Having failed to defeat the Muslim armies in open battle, the Byzantine army withdrew to form a defensive line along the Taurus and Anti-Taurus mountain ranges.[26] The Byzantines were in fact no longer in any position to take the offensive to reconquer their lost possessions in the Levant and Egypt, and would primarily focus on defending their remaining territory in Anatolia.

Finally, the Arab conquests, and the battle of Yarmuk in particular, destroyed the military reputation of Heraclius. Having failed to prevent the loss of half the empire, Heraclius retreated into isolation, by all accounts a broken man, a mere shadow of the former dynamic personality who had been victorious against the Persians merely a decade before.

Bibliography:

Al-Baladhuri. “The Battle of the Yarmuk (636) and After,” Internet Medieval Sourcebook http://www.fordham.edu/Halsall/source/yarmuk.asp

Bailey, Norman A. “The Battle of Yarmuk.” Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies 14, no. 1 (winter/spring 2004): 17-22.

Gregory, Timothy E. A History of Byzantium. Blackwell History of the Ancient World. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005.

Haldon, John. Byzantium at War AD 600-1453. Essential Histories. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002.

Haldon, John. Warfare, State, and Society in the Byzantine World: 565-1204. Warfare and History. London: University College London Press, 1999.

Jenkins, Romilly. Byzantium: The Imperial Centuries AD 610-1071. Medieval Academy Reprints for Teaching. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987.

Kaegi, Walter Emil. Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Kunselman, David E. “Arab-Byzantine War, 629-644 AD” Masters Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2007.

Nicolle, David. The Great Islamic Conquests AD 632-750. Essential Histories. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2009.

Ostrogorsky, George. History of the Byzantine State. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1969.

Treadgold, Warren. A History of the Byzantine State and Society. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997.

 

[1] Timothy E. Gregory, A History of Byzantium, Blackwell History of the Ancient World (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005): 160.

[2] Gregory, 160.

[3] Gregory, 160-161.

[4] George Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1969), 110.

[5] David Nicolle, The Great Islamic Conquests AD 632-750. Essential Histories, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2009), 50.

[6] Nicolle, 49.

[7] Romilly Jenkins, Byzantium: The Imperial Centuries AD 610-1071. Medieval Academy Reprints for Teaching. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 32-33.

[8] David E. Kunselman, “Arab-Byzantine War, 629-644 AD” (Masters Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2007), 71-72.

[9] Walter Emil Kaegi, Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 132-134.

[10] Al-Baladhuri. “The Battle of the Yarmuk (636) and After,” Internet Medieval Sourcebook http://www.fordham.edu/Halsall/source/yarmuk.asp

[11] Jenkins, 33.

[12] Jenkins, 33.

[13] Nicolle, 51.

[14] John Haldon, Warfare, State, and Society in the Byzantine World: 565-1204. Warfare and History. (London: University College London Press, 1999), 215-216.

[15] Jenkins, 34.

[16] Al-Baladhuri. “The Battle of the Yarmuk (636) and After,”

[17] Al-Baladhuri. “The Battle of the Yarmuk (636) and After.”

[18] Jenkins, 33.

[19] Al-Baladhuri. “The Battle of the Yarmuk (636) and After.”

[20] Kunselman, 71.

[21] Norman A. Bailey, “The Battle of Yarmuk.” Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies 14, no. 1 (winter/spring 2004), 20.

[22] Nicolle, 49.

[23] Jenkins, 33.

[24] Kunselman, 71-72.

[25] Warren Treadgold, A History of the Byzantine State and Society. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 304.

[26] John Haldon, Byzantium at War AD 600-1453. Essential Histories, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002), 39.

The Crimean Khanate and the Great Power Struggle for the Ukraine in the 17th Century

The recent annexation of the Crimea by the Russian Federation should remind us of the competing and complicated claims of legitimacy over this tiny black sea territory, in this case between Ukraine and Russia. However, it would be a mistake to analyze Russia’s territorial ambitions as an isolated action, indeed quite the opposite. The Crimean peninsula has long been a contested region between various empires and nations.

During the 17th century, the steppes of Ukraine were subject to a prolonged series of wars between the great powers of Eastern Europe, namely the Ottoman Empire, the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth (PLC) and Russia. During this period the Khanate of Crimea, one of the successor states of the Golden Horde and a vassal of the Ottoman Empire, played a critical role in aiding the Ottoman`s military campaigns against first the PLC, and later against the growing power of Russia.

Though Ottoman and Tatar military power was ultimately broken decisively during the disastrous War of the Holy League (1684-1699), and Russia’s dominance over Ukraine was assured, the result was never a certainty. Throughout most of the 17th century, the Crimean Khanate possessed the potential, and indeed the will, to dominate the Dnieper and Volga plains.

The origins of the Crimean Khanate can be traced roughly to the year 1443, when Haci Giray, one of the unsuccessful contenders for the throne of the Golden Horde, succeeded in establishing an independent authority over the Crimea and the adjacent steppe.[1]

Following the Ottoman capture of Constantinople in 1453, Haci Giray moved quickly to establish a military alliance with the Ottoman Sultan Mehemed II, who he saw as a potential partner in his wars against the Golden Horde.[2] Indeed, the first instance of Tatars and Ottoman military cooperation occurred only a year later in 1454, when Giray Khan sent 7000 troops to assist in Mehemed IIs siege of the Genoese colony of Kaffa, situated on the southern Crimean coast.[3] Though ultimately unsuccessful, the expedition set a precedent for future Ottoman-Tatar cooperation.

The Crimean Khanate’s independence was not to last long, however, as it was quickly incorporated into the Ottoman political orbit. After the death of Giray Khan in 1466, his two sons plunged the Khanate into intermittent civil war for control of their father’s throne. In 1475, Mehemed II seized the opportunity provided by the crisis over the Khanates succession to impose his influence over the Crimea, and by 1478 he was able to place a loyal candidate, Mengli Giray, on the throne.[4] The new Tatar Khan agreed to become an Ottoman vassal, stating in a treaty to be “the enemy of your enemy and the friend of your friend.”[5]

Crimean Khanate around 1600Crimean Khanate around 1600

The Tatar alliance with the Ottomans was to prove remarkably enduring, and was to be a fixture of Eastern European politics until its “independence” was secured by Russia in 1774 by the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji.[6] One reason for the durability of this alliance system was the mutually beneficial value of the relationship for both parties.

For the Ottomans, the Crimean Khanate was particularly helpful in securing the northern frontier of their empire, as well as being a reliable source for skilled cavalry (usually around 20,000) to supplement the Ottoman army on campaign.[7] As the first line of defense against threats to Ottoman ports in Crimea, as well as their dependencies in Wallachia and Transylvania, the Tatars were highly useful as their ability to conduct quick raids into enemy territory could usually be relied upon to slow an enemy army’s advance.[8]

For the Khanate, the Ottoman alignment was necessary to destroy the power of the Golden Horde, who until the late 15th century still posed a formidable military threat. Subsequently, the Ottomans offered protection to the Khanate against the encroachments of the PLC, and subsequently the Russian Empire.

That the Crimean Khanate possessed a formidable military organization is clear by the privileged position afforded to them by the Ottoman’s, yet it remains uncertain exactly how large the Tatar army was. This is important when one wishes to consider what the Tatar army’s military potential could have been, and what they might have been able to achieve if properly supported by the Ottomans.

Alan Fisher, for example, conservatively estimates Tatar military strength at around 40,000-50,000.[9] Other sources place the number around 80,000, or even upwards to 200,000, though this latter figure is almost certainly an exaggeration.[10]

The apogee of the Tatar army was in the early 16th century, with its most notable success being its victory over, and resulting destruction, of the Golden Horde in 1502.[11] Yet the fruits of this victory went not to the Khanate, but to Russia. As the borders of Russia steadily advanced towards the Tatar frontier,  the Crimean Khanate increasingly viewed Russia as their principle rival, and recognized it’s dangerous military potential long before the Ottoman Empire.[12]

The Ottomans, for their part, showed a remarkable degree of indifference to the expansion of Russia during the 16th century, preferring it to a corresponding increase in the Tatar’s political power, which would only weaken their influence over the Khanate. Indeed, during most of this period the Ottomans identified the PLC, not Russia, as its principle enemy along its northern frontier, and as such allocated most of its military resources in the region to face this threat.

Importantly, the Ottomans usually viewed their alliance with the Tatars as being defensive in nature, intending it to provide a buffer against foreign invasions against the Ottoman dependencies in the Balkans. They were therefore less inclined to support Tatar expansionist aspirations which could easily embroil them in a prolonged, expensive, and likely unnecessary conflict in the Ukrainian steppe.[13]

The turning point in Ottoman-Russian relations came in 1654, with the union of the Dnieper Cossacks with Russia, which presented the Crimea Khanate and the Ottoman Empire with a formidable to challenge to their influence and claims of suzerainty over the Ukrainian steppe.[14]

Nevertheless, the Ottomans were initially reluctant to commit further armies into the Ukraine, primarily because they were preoccupied in the Mediterranean and along the Danube frontier by the ongoing war against Austria and Venice.[15] They also feared the weakening of their political influence over the Crimea in the event the Khanate conquered vast new territories along the Dniester and the Volga.

However, the rapid growth of Russian finally prompted a serious Ottoman campaign to expel the Russians from the Ukraine. In 1678, a large Ottoman army, supported by Tatar cavalry, launched an offensive which culminated in the siege of the strategic city of Cihrin.[16] Russian attempts to relieve the city failed, and the Ottomans were able to secure a favorable treaty. Yet, while the Russians were temporarily pushed back, continued warfare along the Polish frontier forced the Ottomans to discontinue their Ukrainian offensive.[17]

Despite the success of Ottoman-Tatar military cooperation, the territorial gains in Ukraine would prove to be temporary, as the Ottomans military power was shattered shortly thereafter during its war against the Austrian Empire and the Holy League. This left the Crimean Khanate dangerously exposed to a Russian attack, a situation which Tsar Peter I (the Great) quickly exploited to his advantage.

While the Ottomans were preoccupied in the Balkans against Austria, the PLC and Venice, Peter the Great led an attack against the Ottoman fortress of Azov in the heart of the Crimean Khanate, which he finally captured in 1696.[18] Though the Tatars managed to evade two other Russian invasions during the war, Peter the Great’s campaigns signaled the beginning of an ominous new era in the Khanate’s relationship with Russia, as her neighbor was able to steadily penetrate its frontier as never before.[19]

Part of the reason for the ease of Russia’s penetration into the Tatar frontier was that it had been severely weakened over the course of the 17th century, as the Crimean Khanate became increasingly subjected to Cossack raids along its borders. This in turn severely depleted the Khanate’s resources and population in numerous border districts.[20] However, the extent of these raids must not be overstated as the Tatars themselves conducted frequent raids against their neighbors throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, which can be said to have had an equally devastating effect.[21]

Despite the advantages that the Ottoman-Tatar relationship conferred to both parties, the alliance nevertheless had a number of serious weaknesses that became increasingly evident as the seventeenth century progressed. Primary amongst these was the difference in Tatar and Ottoman strategic and territorial objectives.

As has been noted before, the Crimean Khanate maintained claims on most the territories of the former Golden Horde, namely between the Dniester and Volga Rivers. The Ottomans, by contrast, saw the Khanate as merely part of its northern defensive frontier, and was rarely inclined to support large-scale military enterprises aimed at conquests at the expense of the PLC, Russia and the various Cossack Hetmanates.

Indeed, the Ottomans were always suspicious of Tatar military ambitions, fearing that large-scale conquests would dramatically increase the military power of the Crimean Khanate, and thereby reduce Ottoman political influence over the Crimea. It must therefore be concluded that the Ottomans did not share the fears of the Crimean Khanate in regards to the expansion of Russia’s power, at least until the beginning the seventeenth century. When the Ottomans did commit large armies to the steppes of Ukraine, their military campaigns were primarily directed against the PLC, which allowed Russia to gradually expand her influence and territory in the Ukraine.

By the end of the seventeenth century, the Crimean Khanate’s strategic position had been drastically reduced, and though it would endure for almost another century, its military position was weakened by the rapid expansion of Russian military power in eastern and central Ukraine and by the gradual, but steady, decline of Ottoman military capabilities.

 

Bibliography:

 

Fisher, Alan. “Muscovy and the Black Sea Slave Trade”, Canadian American Slavic Studies. (Winter 1972).

Fisher, Alan. The Ottoman Crimea in the Mid-Seventeenth Century: Some Preliminary Considerations. Harvard Ukrainian Studies, vol. 3/4 (1979-1980): 215-226.

Fisher, Alan. The Russian Annexation of the Crimea 1772-1783. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

Fisher, Alan. The Crimean Tatars. Stanford: University of Stanford Press, 1978.

Inalchik, Halil. Struggle for East-European Empire: 1400-1700 The Crimean Khanate, Ottomans and the Rise of the Russian Empire. (Ankara University: The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, 21), 1982.

Kortepeter, C.M. Gazi Giray II, Khan of the Crimea, and Ottoman Policy in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus,1588-94. The Slavonic and East European Review 44, no. 102 (1966): 139-166.

Scott, H. M. The Emergence of the Eastern Powers, 1756-1775. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2001.

Williams, Brian Glyn. The Sultan’s Raiders: The Military Role of the Crimean Tatars in the Ottoman Empire. Washington D.C: The Jamestown Foundation, 2013.

Vásáry, István. “The Crimean Khanate and the Great Horde (1440s–1500s): A Fight for Primacy.” In The Crimean Khanate between East and West (15th–18th Century), edited by Denise Klein. Otto Harrassowitz: Wiesbaden, 2012.

 

[1] Brian Glyn Williams. The Sultan’s Raiders: The Military Role of the Crimean Tatars in the Ottoman Empire. (Washington D.C: The Jamestown Foundation, 2013), 2. There is, however, some debate as to the exact date that Crimea became a separate political entity from the Golden Horde. István Vásáry, for example, puts the date of the Khanate’s foundation in 1449 (István Vásáry. “The Crimean Khanate and the Great Horde (1440s–1500s): A Fight for Primacy.” In The Crimean Khanate between East and West (15th–18th Century), edited by Denise Klein. (Otto Harrassowitz: Wiesbaden, 2012), 15).

[2] Williams, 2.

[3] Ibid, 2.

[4] Ibid, 2.

[5] Alan Fisher, The Crimean Tatars. (Stanford: University of Stanford Press, 1978),  5.

[6] H. M Scott. The Emergence of the Eastern Powers, 1756-1775. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 232.

[7] Williams, 8.

[8] C. M. Kortepeter, “Gazi Giray II, Khan of the Crimea, and Ottoman Policy in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus,1588-94”, The Slavonic and East European Review 44, no. 102 (1966): 140.

[9] Allen Fisher, The Russian Annexation of the Crimea 1772-1783. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 15.

[10] Williams, 5.

[11] Ibid, 15.

[12] Ibid, 15.

[13] Halil Inalchik, “Struggle for East-European Empire: 1400-1700, The Crimean Khanate, Ottomans and the Rise of the Russian Empire” (Ankara University: The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, 21, 1982):6.

[14] Ibid, 7.

[15] Ibid, 7-8.

[16] Ibid, 8.

[17] Ibid, 8.

[18] Williams, 18.

[19] Ibid, 18.

[20] Alan Fisher, The Ottoman Crimea in the Mid-Seventeenth Century: Some Preliminary Considerations. Harvard Ukrainian Studies, vol. 3/4 (1979-1980): 216.

[21] For example, in Poland alone it has been estimated that between 1474 to 1694 roughly 1 million Poles were carried off by the Tatars to be sold into slavery. Alan Fisher, “Muscovy and the Black Sea Slave Trade.” Canadian American Slavic Studies. (Winter 1972): 582.